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Abstract
We asked adults with Asperger Syndrome to judge pictorial stimuli in terms of certain social stereotypes to evaluate to what extent
they have access to this type of social knowledge. Sixteen adults with Asperger Syndrome and 24 controls, matched for age and intel-
ligence, were presented with sets of faces, bodies and objects, which had to be rated on a 7-point scale in terms of trustworthiness, attrac-
tiveness, social status, and age, or, in the case of objects, price. Despite impaired performance on two important aspects of social
cognition (second-order mentalizing and face recognition) the social judgements of the individuals with Asperger Syndrome were just
as competent and consistent as those of their matched controls, with only one exception: there was a trend for them to be less able
to judge the attractiveness of faces if they were the same sex. We explain this diﬀerence in terms of a weakness in mentalizing, speciﬁcally
the ability to take a diﬀerent point of view: While all other stereotypic attributions could be made from an egocentric point of view,
judging the attractiveness of faces of one’s own sex requires taking the perspective of someone of the opposite sex, a challenge for people
with mentalizing problems. We conclude that individuals with Asperger Syndrome show preserved aspects of social knowledge, as
revealed in the attribution of stereotypes to pictures of people. These ﬁndings suggest that there are dissociable subcomponents to social
cognition and that not all of these are compromised in Asperger Syndrome.
 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The social impairments present in autism-spectrum dis-
orders form part of the essential diagnostic criteria used to
deﬁne such conditions (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric
Association, 2000). Asperger Syndrome (AS) is widely
acknowledged to be a variant of autistic disorder, without
a delay in language and cognitive development. Children
with AS are typically diagnosed in later childhood (Macin-
tosh & Dissanayake, 2004). The later diagnosis may be par-
tially explained by the presence of good language and often
outstanding intellectual abilities, which can mask deﬁcien-
cies in social development and cognitive ﬂexibility (Frith,
2004).
Among the social impairments documented in AS are
mentalizing problems (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Jolliﬀe, Morti-
more, & Robertson, 1997; Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan,
Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999; Castelli, Frith, Happe´, &
Frith, 2002; Happe´, 1994; Heavey, Phillips, Baron-Cohen,
& Rutter, 2000; Kleinman, Marciano, & Ault, 2001; Ruth-
erford, Baron-Cohen, & Wheelwright, 2002). However,
these impairments typically only involve diﬃculties with
second-order-, but not ﬁrst-order-, mental state attribution
(Baron-Cohen, 1989; Ziatas, Durkin, & Pratt, 1998).
Face processing is one area of social cognition that has
recently received much attention by autism researchers
(see Grelotti, Gauthier, & Schultz, 2002, for a review).
Faces hold a wealth of information about the identity
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of the person and their group membership. Even if of
neutral expression, they give vital cues to the initiation or
avoidance of social contact, and appropriate mode of
approach. A variety of impairments in face processing have
been revealed speciﬁcally in people with high-functioning
autism or AS.
Some of these impairments involve mentalizing. For
example, individuals with AS or high-functioning autism
are poor at predicting the intentions or mental states of
others from pictures of their eyes (Baron-Cohen et al.,
1997; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb,
2001). However, there are also impairments that are likely
to be of separate origin. Thus, there are problems in face
recognition memory (Blair, Frith, Smith, Abell, & Cip-
olotti, 2002) and emotional expression understanding
(Hobson, 1993). Additionally, the scan path of eye gaze
when looking at faces can give clues as to the origin of
these problems. Individuals with autistic disorder have
been shown to have a preference for attending to the
mouth region of the face when the bias in normal develop-
ment is for the eyes (Joseph & Tanaka, 2003; Klin, Jones,
Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002). If they avoid looking
at the eyes, they would therefore miss important communi-
cative signals conveyed by the eye regions, such as emo-
tional expression.
Emotional responsiveness and emotion regulation are
also areas where impairments have been noted (Hill, Ber-
thoz, & Frith, 2004; Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Yaniv, &
Aharon-Peretz, 2002). However, many aspects of social
cognition, such as implicit imitation of action, empathy
for others’ feelings, and the use of speech and gesture in
two-way communication, still remain to be investigated
in people with AS. It seems possible that in view of their
varied clinical picture, which can include milder forms with
more subtle impairments, some aspects of social knowledge
may show preserved functioning. Certainly, there is ample
biographical evidence that adults with AS can be highly
skilled at learning and applying social rules (e.g., Gerland,
1997; Lawson, 1998; Sainsbury, 2000), and in autistic dis-
orders in general there is evidence of successful teaching
of social skills (e.g., Silver & Oakes, 2001).
One aspect of social cognition, the ability to use social
stereotypes, has as yet hardly been studied in autism-spec-
trum disorders, although it has been a major focus of
research in traditional social psychology. Stereotypes allow
us to categorise people we have never met before, thus sim-
plifying and organising social information. For example,
we are prepared to give a preliminary judgement as to
whether a person is attractive, trustworthy, or has high
social status from minimal visual cues. Knowledge of ste-
reotypes is thought to be culturally transmitted and typical-
ly emerges from about the age of 3 years (Hirschfeld, 1996).
Importantly, stereotyping allows us to prepare for poten-
tial social interaction by making predictions about a per-
son’s behaviour on the basis of their group membership
(Mackie, Hamilton, Susskind, & Rosselli, 1996). Stereo-
types therefore may help us to decide from a photograph
whether we may wish to avoid or to meet an unfamiliar
person independently of what that person is like as an
individual.
One of the ﬁrst neuropsychological studies to exploit
the ability to make quick judgments of people on the
basis of photographs was carried out by Adolphs, Tranel,
and Damasio (1998). They showed a set of 100 faces to
three patients with bilateral amygdala damage and asked
them to rate on a 7-point scale, either approachability
(how much they wanted to walk up to a person and strike
up a conversation with them) or, in another session, trust-
worthiness (how much they would trust that person with
all their money or with their life). Since the attribution of
these characteristics to photographs is subjective, the
authors established a reference sample of 46 undergradu-
ates to rate this set of faces and used these ratings as a
standard against which to compare the ratings of the
patients. They found that the patients rated the 50 most
negative faces more positively compared to ratings given
by the control sample, and also by 10 patients with other
types of brain damage. This was true for both trustwor-
thiness and approachability, whereas they gave similarly
positive ratings to the faces that the control sample
judged as the 50 most positive.
Adolphs, Sears, and Piven (2001) used the same task
with individuals with AS and found that these individuals
performed similarly to the amygdala patients, also judging
the 50 most untrustworthy faces as more trustworthy than
controls while rating the most trustworthy ones equally
positively. However, somewhat surprisingly, they per-
formed as well as controls in their judgment of approach-
ability. Adolphs and colleagues concluded that
individuals with AS, like patients with bilateral amygdala
lesions, show less ability to discriminate faces in terms of
subjectively perceived trustworthiness with a bias towards
strong positive ratings in some individuals.
Just what perceptual information we use from the pho-
tographs to make these judgements is not clear, but the
attribution of social traits such as trustworthiness and
approachability is likely to draw on social knowledge, spe-
ciﬁcally, on culturally acquired knowledge about stereo-
types. There are a number of reasons to think that this is
likely to be an area of diﬃculty in AS. First, if some basic
perceptual aspects of face processing are impaired or at
least abnormal in individuals with AS, this may prove a
disadvantage in acquiring such knowledge. Second, if a
degree of mentalizing impairment is present, then individu-
als with AS would be expected to be less able to acquire
knowledge of stereotypes, given that this knowledge is
socially transmitted.
Bearing in mind the mixed results from the Adolphs
et al. (2001) study, we explored further dimensions of
important social stereotypes using their paradigm of judg-
ing faces. In particular, we wished to explore the dimen-
sions of attractiveness and social status, but we also
included trustworthiness to replicate the ﬁndings from their
original study.
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2. Method
2.1. Participants
In total, 24 control adults (12m:12f) and 16 adults with
AS (10m:6f) took part in the study, aged between 18 and 63
years and with intelligence in the normal range
(FSIQP 85). The groups were matched for gender
(v = 0.606) and age (t (38) = 1.280) as well as verbal, per-
formance and full-scale IQ (t (38)<1) (see Table 1). Partic-
ipants were recruited through adverts placed in local
community centres, as well as in Asperger Support Group
newsletters and on web pages. All participants in the exper-
imental group had previously received a diagnosis of AS
from a clinical psychologist or a psychiatrist. To support
their diagnoses we used the Autism-Spectrum Quotient
(AQ) questionnaire (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner,
Martin, & Clubley, 2001). The adults with AS showed a
signiﬁcantly elevated score on the AQ (t (37) = 7.98,
p < .001), and all but three of the adults with AS were
above the suggested cut-oﬀ of 32 on this measure, while
none of the controls were.
The study obtained ethical approval from the Joint
UCL/UCLH committees on the Ethics of Human
Research and informed consent to participate was obtained
from each adult.
2.2. Procedure
All participants were tested individually in a quiet room
at the Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience. Testing was
divided into two sessions of about 11
2
h each and all partic-
ipants completed a battery of standard tasks, to provide
background information on both their general ability and
social functioning, as well as the experimental tasks.
Verbal and performance IQ were assessed by means of
the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-IIIUK;
Wechsler, 1999). Standard ﬁrst- and second-order false
belief tasks (‘Sally-Ann,’ Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith,
1985; ‘Coat Story,’ Bowler, 1992) and an advanced test
of mentalizing (Strange Stories—revised version; Happe´
et al., 1996) were administered.
As some of the experimental tasks involved the observa-
tion of faces, the Benton Facial Recognition Task (Benton,
Sivan, Hamsher, Varney, & Spreen, 1994) was included to
look for any visuo-perceptual deﬁcits in the processing of
faces that might otherwise explain any group diﬀerences
on the experimental tasks.
2.2.1. Experimental tasks
Nine tasks, corresponding to nine experimental condi-
tions, were included. Each task consisted of a set of 48
stimuli, presented one by one on a laptop computer using
E-prime software. All participants responded to all stimuli
in all conditions. Each condition was presented as a sepa-
rate block, and both the blocks and the stimuli within each
block were presented in a random order. The participants
were asked to judge each picture for a particular attribute
on a scale ranging from 1 (low) to 7 (high), with 4 as the
mid point; this scale was chosen to increase task diﬃculty
and avoid ceiling eﬀects that were likely from a binary
response (yes/no). Five diﬀerent stimulus sets were used
and these were either photos of faces, of people with their
faces obscured, or of objects. The attributes to be judged
from the faces and people were trustworthiness, attractive-
ness, socioeconomic status and age, whilst price was judged
for each object (see Table 2). All stimuli were greyscale
images, the faces and people were frontal images and the
faces were all Caucasian1 with neutral expressions and
without clothes or hats. Each picture was presented for a
maximum of 10 s, although participants were encouraged
to respond as quickly as possible.
To facilitate the investigation of face processing, Perrett
and his colleagues (e.g., Perrett, May, & Yoshikawa, 1994)
have created a large data base of face stimuli, which has
been widely used in research. We adopted some of these
stimuli, which had been previously rated for the relevant
social attributes to form two of the sets of images we used.
The judgment of attractiveness was elicited from a set of
faces, for which O’Doherty et al. (2003) had collected rat-
ings from 23 university students and staﬀ, with an average
age of 24 years. This was the only set to contain both male
and female individuals (an equal number of each), as
opposed to all male individuals in all other sets of images.
Table 1
Means (and standard deviations) for group demographics
Control AS
N (male:female) 24 (12:12) 16 (10:6)
Age (years) 37.75 (12.44) 32.31 (14.20)
Verbal IQ 117.13 (12.65) 113.13 (16.37)
Performance IQ 110.92 (12.87) 108.00 (13.71)
Full-scale IQ 115.25 (11.35) 111.81 (15.60)
AQ (p < .001) 16.65 (6.81) 34.63 (7.08)
Table 2
Summary of stimulus sets and attributes judged from them
Type of stimulus Attributes judged Source
Set 1 Faces Trustworthiness, age Winston et al.
(2002)
Set 2 Faces Attractiveness, age O’Doherty et al.
(2003)
Set 3 Faces Socioeconomic status, age Novel
Set 4 People with Socioeconomic status, age Novel
blurred faces
Set 5 Objects Price Novel
1 The participants in both groups were also overwhelmingly Caucasian;
one adult with AS was half Oriental and one control was Asian.
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For the judgement of trustworthiness we used a subset of
those for which Winston, Strange, O’Doherty, and Dolan
(2002) had collected ratings from 30 adults, also university
students and staﬀ, also with an average age of 24 years.
We devised a novel set of faces for the judgement of
socioeconomic status. To control for the possibility that
poor face processing might impact on social judgements
from faces, we also constructed a set of greyscale photo-
graphs of whole persons with blurred faces. Here, social
status had to be inferred from clothes and/or body posture
rather than facial characteristics. Because ratings of social
status from these stimuli is entirely subjective, we asked
14 university students and staﬀ, from the same pool as
those who had rated the sets of faces for attractiveness
and trustworthiness in previous studies, to rate the faces
and bodies on the attribute of social status. None of these
raters were used in the control sample in our experiment,
and so these ratings constitute an independent standard
for the various social attributes that are subjectively attrib-
uted to the stimuli used. We will refer to them as reference
samples.
Age judgements from all four sets of photos were also
included. These are more likely to be based on physical fea-
tures. Here absolute values were ascribed to each of the
seven points of the scale (1 = less than 10 years; 2 = 10–
19 years; 3 = 20–29 years; 4 = 30–39 years; 5 = 40–49
years; 6 = 50–59 years; 7 = 60 years or more). Because
the judgment of age is still subjective, we used again refer-
ence samples of between 6 and 13 individuals whom we
asked to judge the ages of the people in the photographs
of all four sets.
An ‘objects’ condition was included as a non-social stim-
ulus set to assess the extent to which the individuals with
AS were able to understand the concept of making judge-
ments using a 7-point scale. Price was chosen as a reason-
ably objective attribute. The objects were chosen from a
range of familiar items that can be priced in distinct catego-
ries of monetary value, and participants were informed that
all objects were real full-size objects, rather than miniature
toys. Again, a deﬁned 7-point scale was used (1 = less than
£1; 2 = £1–10; 3 = £11–50; 4 = £51–100; 5 = £101–1000;
6 = £1001–10,000; 7 = £10,000+). As before, a reference
sample of eight individuals judged the price of each object.
Unlike in the case of age, examples of the full range of cat-
egories was represented. This has implications for the size
of the diﬀerence between the ranks given to the most
extreme low and high stimuli (see below).
2.2.2. Method of analysis
Given that the judgement of social attributes in picture
sets is subjective, we adopted a ‘ranking of extremes’ sys-
tem to analyse the data. We used data from the reference
samples to determine the ranking of the 48 stimuli in each
set. In this way, we identiﬁed the eight lowest and the eight
highest-ranking pictures on each attribute; only data from
these endpoint stimuli were used in further analyses. These
endpoints are shown for stimulus sets 3–5 in Fig. 1.
The examples for objects and prices may indicate that large
Price
Socioeconomic status
Age (status set)
Age
Socioeconomic status
Fig. 1. End point stimuli; the 8 lowest (top line) and 8 highest (bottom line) ranked stimuli from the reference group for socioeconomic status and for price
of objects.
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diﬀerences would be expected between the ranks given to
the extremes. As the attractiveness set contained female
pictures as well as male pictures, we selected the four most
extreme males and the four most extreme females.
As already mentioned, all participants ranked all 48
stimuli in each condition. We extracted the rankings they
gave to the eight lowest and eight highest ranked stimuli
as deﬁned by the reference samples. We then calculated
the diﬀerence in mean ranking between these endpoint
stimuli for each participant and used paired samples t tests
to compare the two groups’ performance for each of the
nine conditions.
We did not compare the absolute values of the diﬀerence
between endpoint stimuli across attributes, as no attempt
had been made to equate the range of the attributes in the
diﬀerent sets. Thus, certain attributes would be expected
to produce smaller diﬀerences due to a lower range of the
attribute in that particular set. This does not reﬂect a lesser
ability to discriminate. For example, age had a rather small
range of diﬀerences in the set of faces rated for attractive-
ness. Nevertheless the faces judged youngest and oldest by
the reference samples were also diﬀerentiated by our partic-
ipants, with a mean diﬀerence of around 1 point on the giv-
en 7-point scale. While a diﬀerence score of 0 indicates no
diﬀerentiation between high and low stimuli, a diﬀerence
score above 0 indicates at least some degree of ability to dif-
ferentiate. Possible scores range from 6 to +6, although
such extreme scores are unlikely, and negative scores indi-
cate a reverse preference compared to the reference sample.
We wish to emphasize that we cannot use this score to
deduce the absolute level of ability to make the various
attributions. To do this it would be necessary to have nor-
mative data and a number of diﬀerent stimulus sets to
assess whether performance was independent of speciﬁc
stimulus characteristics. Thus, we are not making any
claims as to individual diﬀerences in competence. Instead
our data address the question of diﬀerences in group abil-
ities to diﬀerentiate between independently ranked lowest
and highest pictures in a given set on a given dimension.
Thus, if individuals with AS were to obtain a signiﬁcantly
smaller score compared to the controls, we would infer that
their ability to use a given social attribute is impaired.
3. Results
Compared to the age and IQ matched control group, the
adults with AS showed impairments in mentalizing as a
group, a typical result. They were impaired at the second-
order (v = 6.667, p = .010), but not ﬁrst-order (v =
1.538), false belief task as well as at the advanced test of
mentalizing (t (38) = 2.042, p = .048), although there was
a high degree of overlap in individual results with the con-
trol group (AS range: 5–16; control range: 10–16). The
adults with AS were also impaired as a group relative to
controls on the Benton Facial Recognition Task
(t (18.57) = 3.599, p = .002), indicating poor perceptual
processing of faces (see Table 3), although there was again
overlap in performance between the groups (AS range:
36–50; control range: 42–54).
As can be seen in Table 4, the group with AS and the
controls performed remarkably similarly when rating the
diﬀerent sets of images in terms of social attributes. Only
one group diﬀerence was found in the ratings of the nine
picture sets. This occurred when judging attractiveness
from faces. The individuals with AS had a smaller diﬀer-
ence in their ranks given to the endpoint stimuli compared
to the controls (t (38) = 2.390, p = .022), indicating that
they were diﬀerentiating less well between low and high
stimuli. However, we note that if a correction for multiple
comparisons was applied to the four critical conditions
(leaving out the control conditions of age and price), this
diﬀerence would no longer be signiﬁcant (p = .088). There
was also a high degree of overlap in the range of scores
(AS range: 0.25 to 3.63; control range: 1.5–4.63). No
other diﬀerences were found in any other condition (see
Table 4 and Fig. 2).
Correlations within the group of adults with AS were
calculated between the diﬀerence scores for the four critical
conditions and were found to be signiﬁcant between trust-
worthiness, status from faces and status from people
(p < .05). Attractiveness, however, was not correlated to
any of these measures. Correlations between performance
on these social attribution tasks, the higher-order mentaliz-
ing task, the face perception task and IQ were also calculat-
ed in the group of adults with AS. Verbal IQ was
unsurprisingly correlated to performance on the higher-order
Table 3
Means (and standard deviations; unless otherwise stated) of group results
from background tests
Control AS
First-order FB (% passing) 100 93.75
Second-order FB (% passing)* 100 75
Advanced theory of mind test*(max = 16) 13.79 (1.69) 12.31 (2.89)
Benton** 49.71 (3.16) 44.14 (5.26)
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
Table 4
Means (and standard deviations) of the diﬀerence between endpoint
stimuli for each group on each condition
Control AS
Faces Set 1: Trustworthiness 1.35 (0.55) 1.06 (0.99)
Faces Set 1: Age 2.14 (0.61) 2.26 (0.62)
Faces Set 2: Attractiveness 2.76* (0.95) 1.98*(1.11)
Faces Set 2: Age 1.01 (0.42) 0.94 (0.36)
Faces Set 3: Status 1.55 (0.69) 1.45 (0.96)
Faces Set 3: Age 2.15 (0.56) 2.25 (0.41)
People: Status 1.72 (0.74) 1.72 (1.09)
People: Age 2.47 (0.79) 2.43 (0.99)
Objects: Price 5.25 (0.28) 5.12 (0.42)
Attractiveness: same sex 2.75** (0.93) 1.64** (1.43)
Attractiveness: opposite sex 2.77 (1.19) 2.31 (1.07)
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
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mentalizing task (p = .013) but no other correlations were
signiﬁcant. However, it should be noted that these correla-
tions would no longer be signiﬁcant if a correction for mul-
tiple comparisons was applied.
To investigate whether the individuals with AS were
deﬁning attractiveness diﬀerently to controls and therefore
appeared to be worse at judging attractiveness, intra-group
agreement was calculated for each group using Kendall’s
coeﬃcient of concordance. Although both groups showed
high intra-group agreement (AS, W (47) = 0.416, p < .001;
control, W (47) = 0.654, p < .001), the level of agreement
was lower within the group of individuals with AS (value
of W closer to 0). This diﬀerence in levels of agreement
was found to be signiﬁcant (p = .007), using a multiple per-
mutations test.2
One diﬀerence between the attractiveness stimulus set
and the other face sets was that it was the only set to con-
tain both male and female faces. The attractiveness data
was therefore reanalysed, after separating judgements into
those when judging a face of the same sex or of the oppo-
site sex. This comparison revealed that the individuals with
AS were only worse than the controls when judging faces
of the same sex, discriminating between high and low
attractiveness faces less well than controls (t (38) = 2.978,
p = .005) (see Table 4 and Fig. 2). Further analysis revealed
that this diﬀerence arose from the individuals with AS ﬁnd-
ing the highly attractive same sex faces less attractive than
controls did (t (38) = 2.676, p = .011). Furthermore, the
controls were as good at judging the attractiveness of faces
of the same or opposite sex (t (23) = 0.104) whereas the AS
adults were worse at judging faces of the same sex than the
opposite sex (t (15) = 2.234, p = .041).
As a more complete replication of the Adolphs et al.
(2001) results, the data from the trustworthiness judgements
were reanalysed using a control group similar to that used in
their study. Their control group consisted of 46 university
undergraduates (see Adolphs et al., 1998), a population sim-
ilar to that used in Winston et al. (2002), whilst our control
group was carefully matched to our group of adults with AS
on measures of intelligence and age. In addition, Adolphs
et al.’s stimuli were ranked on the basis of their control
group’s trustworthiness ratings rather than on the basis of
an independent reference sample’s ratings. This created
the greatest possible diﬀerence between high and low stim-
ulus means for their control group, thus biasing any other
group to produce a smaller diﬀerence, and therefore
increasing the likelihood of ﬁnding a diﬀerence between
the groups. Conversely, the present study used a separate
group of controls external to the experiment (the reference
sample in Winston et al., 2002) to rank the stimuli, thus
minimising the chance of producing a false positive result.
The trustworthiness data were therefore reanalysed using
the Winston et al. (2002) reference sample (n = 30) for both
the ranking and as the comparison control group. Using this
approach, our data reveal the same results as Adolphs et al.
(2001), with the adults with AS discriminating more poorly
between the endpoint stimuli (t (44) = 3.688, p = .001),
ranking the low faces as higher than the controls
(t (44) = 5.349. p < .001) but being comparable on the high
faces (t (44) = 0.382). Furthermore, if the same comparison
is made between the Winston et al. (2002) reference sample
and the present control group, the same diﬀerence is found
with the present controls being worse at discriminating end
points (t (45.8) = 3.972, p < .001), judging the low faces as
higher than the controls (t (52) = 5.789, p < .001) but not
the high faces (t (50.1) = 0.571).3Webelieve that this replica-
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Fig. 2. Graph showing the diﬀerence between endpoint stimuli for each group on each condition; error bars show standard error of the mean. *p < .05.
2 This method involves the random allocation of participants to the two
groups 1000 times, recalculating each time the diﬀerence between the
Kendall’sW for the two groups, and thus creating a null distribution. The
diﬀerence between Kendall’s W for the two actual groups is then
compared to the null distribution and the probability of this diﬀerence
occurring is calculated.
3 One further small diﬀerence between the present study and that of
Adolphs et al. (2001) was in the method of data analysis. Further analysis
revealed that using their slightly diﬀerent method produced identical
results to ours with the trustworthiness stimuli (ranking the stimuli on the
basis of the reference group instead of the controls); no diﬀerence was
found between the groups for either the low (t (38) = 0.495) or high
(t (38) = 1.175) stimuli. Any diﬀerences between our results and those of
Adolphs et al. (2001) therefore cannot be assumed to be due to the method
of analysis used.
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tion shows that our results are comparable to those of
Adolphs et al. (2001), butwe propose that ourmore stringent
control procedure is more appropriate. If so, the previous
claim of a group diﬀerence in the judgement of trustworthi-
ness must be considered with caution.
4. Discussion
Despite poor facial perception as assessed by the Ben-
ton Facial Recognition Task, and poor mentalizing abili-
ties, as evident in an advanced story comprehension test,
the present group of individuals with AS were just as
competent in making social judgements from photographs
as a group of ordinary individuals matched for age and
IQ. This result is surprising for two reasons. First, despite
their impairments in face recognition, they did not diﬀer
from the controls when attributing a social stereotype,
such as status, to faces or to whole bodies. Second,
despite their impairments in mentalizing, they did not dif-
fer from the controls when attributing social stereotypes,
such as status or trustworthiness, or a more physical con-
struct such as age.
The correlational trends between performance on the
diﬀerent social attributes within the AS group suggest that
these tasks may be tapping the same underlying ability. On
the other hand, there were no such correlational trends
between performance on these social attributes and our
other two measures of social competence, face recognition
and stories requiring theory of mind reasoning. This sup-
ports the idea that the judgement of stereotypic social attri-
butes is independent from other aspects of social cognition.
Our ﬁndings imply that access to knowledge of social
stereotypes was equally available to our group of individ-
uals with AS as to our group of controls, and in particu-
lar that it is not necessary for two important aspects of
social cognition, mentalizing and face perception, to be
intact for the ability to judge social attributes from pic-
tures of faces. How can the surprising competence of
our socially impaired individuals with AS be explained?
Hirschfeld (1995) suggested that knowledge of stereotypes
is encompassed by a domain of naı¨ve sociology that is
separate to naı¨ve psychology. In contrast to naı¨ve psy-
chology, which is assumed to rest on the ability to mental-
ize, naı¨ve sociology is assumed to rest on the ability to
reason about group membership. Thus, to acquire and
use social stereotypes requires the capacity to understand
others in terms of their group membership and the char-
acteristics that are representative of a group. If this ability
is based on a separate cognitive mechanism, as Hirschfeld
suggests, then it is entirely possible that despite mentaliz-
ing and face perception impairments, individuals with AS
have a preserved ability to attribute social stereotypes to
photographs.
This possibility is in line with anecdotal evidence which
suggests that individuals with AS may show implicit under-
standing of social stereotypes. For example, when they
aspire to have a partner, they often specify that this must
be an attractive partner, such as a movie star, while their
family may try in vain to induce more realistic expecta-
tions. Furthermore, there is evidence from the scant previ-
ous literature on attributional processes in AS, suggesting
that mentalizing abilities and attributional processes may
be distinct (Blackshaw, Kinderman, Hare, & Hatton,
2001), although it should be noted that this study uses a
very diﬀerent paradigm to the present one and has very dif-
ferent aims.
The only diﬀerence between our AS group and controls
was found when judging attractiveness. In fact, this impair-
ment was only present when judging the attractiveness of
someone of the same sex: AS adults judged highly attrac-
tive faces of the same sex less attractive than controls.
While they were still able to discriminate between the
attractive and unattractive faces, they were less accurate
than controls at such judgements, and less accurate than
when they judged faces of the opposite sex.
What could be the cause of such a speciﬁc deﬁcit? We
suggest that it could in fact be due to mentalizing problems.
Same sex attractiveness judgements are diﬀerent from all
the other judgements because they are the only ones that
require a change in point of view, which is a challenge
for people with mentalizing diﬃculties: You need to take
the point of view of someone of the opposite sex to give
an appropriate judgement of the attractiveness of someone
who is the same sex as you. In contrast, the judgement of
social status, trustworthiness and attractiveness of the
opposite sex can be made from an egocentric perspective,
i.e., simply based on one’s own attitude to each picture
without taking someone else’s perspective. If making such
judgements from an egocentric point of view, you might
be inclined to simply give your own attitude toward the pic-
ture and thus judge highly attractive faces of the same sex
as less attractive than those of the opposite sex in the same
set of pictures. Given their problems in mentalizing, the
individuals with AS may not have based their judgement
on a change in perspective, and thus produced less consis-
tent and less typical results. There is reason to believe that
normal adults, when judging a face of the same sex, do so
in relation to their own attractiveness (Buss, 1992). The
present data hint that individuals with AS are inclined to
judge highly attractive faces of the same sex as less attrac-
tive, implying perhaps that in their self perception they are
highly attractive.
Overall, our results demonstrate that social knowledge is
far from absent in individuals with AS. In particular, they
suggest that culturally transmitted knowledge about stereo-
types and group membership (Hirschfeld, 1996) can be
acquired by individuals with AS who are socially impaired.
However, the present study only informs us about the abil-
ity to use stereotypic knowledge from pictures; it does not
tell us to what extent this knowledge is used in everyday
life. This is a challenging question that now needs to be
investigated. At the very least, this study suggests that even
with impaired mentalizing, studying pictures of people and
talking about them as members of a social group may be a
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useful aid to social learning, and this is indeed a feature of
many social skills training programmes. This study sup-
ports the notion that social cognition has many diﬀerent
cognitive components and that there are aspects of social
cognition that are spared in AS.
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